Abstract
Introduction
It is important to note that market abuse 1 is outlawed both at a federal and state level in the United States of America (the US). 2 In relation to this, it is worth noting that the state prohibition on market abuse has relatively and immensely contributed to the combating of market abuse activities in the US capital and financial markets to date. Consequently, it is on this basis that this article provides a brief overview analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition, firstly in California state. Secondly, a similar analysis will be done focusing on Delaware state. Lastly, the enforcement of the market abuse ban in Washington state will be undertaken. The aforementioned states are selected not only because of their unique and relatively consistent anti-market abuse enforcement approaches, 3 but also because of the potential enforcement lessons that could be adopted from such approaches, especially in South Africa. 4 Thereafter and where appropriate, relevant provisions and cases from the selected US states will be contrasted with similar provisions and cases in South Africa in order to identify and recommend, where necessary, possible anti-market abuse enforcement approaches that could be incorporated in the South African anti-market abuse regulatory and enforcement framework.
Overview of the State Prohibition on Market Abuse

Prohibition on Insider Trading in California
Insider trading is statutorily prohibited under the California Corporations Code. 5 Put differently, an issuer or any other person who is an officer, director or controlling person of such issuer or any person who knowingly has access directly or indirectly, to material non-public information that relates to any securities by virtue of his relationship with the issuer is prohibited from dealing in such securities in order to prevent insider trading. 6 Notably, there is a requirement of knowledge on the part of the accused person that the material non-public information he obtained will significantly affect the market price of the securities in question before incurring any insider trading liability. 7 Moreover, such liability can only be imposed upon the accused if he fails to prove that the affected person was aware of the non-public information in question; or that the affected person would have purchased or sold the securities in question at the same price even if the material non-public information was made public. 8 California's insider trading prohibition is limited only to officers, directors, controlling shareholders of an issuer (primary insiders) and/or any other person who obtains non-public material information by virtue of his relationship with primary insiders. 9 Consequently, violations by other persons who fortuitously obtain non-public material information not on the basis of their relationship with any of the primary insiders are not expressly covered under California's insider trading prohibition. 10 Nonetheless, California's insider trading prohibition has an extra-territorial application that covers any violations that are perpetrated in California by primary insiders of a corporation incorporated in another state or country (foreign corporations). 11 In relation to this, accessorial liability can also be imposed on individuals who tip, induce or assist others to contravene any California's insider trading provisions. 12 
Prohibition on Market Manipulation in California
Disclosure-based market manipulation, trade-based market manipulation, Internet-based market manipulation and commodity-based market manipulation practices are statutorily prohibited under the California Corporations Code. Tradebased market manipulation practices include:
(a) the use of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the price of a security; 13 (b) effecting a transaction in a security which involves no change in the beneficial ownership; (c) entering orders for the sale or purchase of any security with the knowledge that similar orders have been entered at the same price and/or at the same time for that security by the same or different persons; and (d) effecting alone, or with other persons, a series of transactions in any security to create actual or apparent active trading in such security in order to raise or depress the price of that security for the purposes of inducing its sale or purchase by others. 14 -3 <http://www.bingham.com.01.2006/03> (accessed 26-10-2013 Disclosure-based market manipulation practices include the dissemination of false or misleading material information pertaining to the sale or purchase of a security by a broker-dealer or any other person so that the price of such security will or is likely to rise or fall (raising or depressing its market price) for the purposes of inducing others to purchase or sell that security. 15 In line with this, disclosure-based market manipulation practices also include the oral or written communication of false or misleading statements that relate to the sale or purchase of securities by any offenders. 16 Liability for both disclosure-based market manipulation and trade-based market manipulation requires proof on the part of the prosecution that the offenders wilfully participated, directly or indirectly in the effecting of a manipulative transaction or in the making or dissemination of a false and misleading statement of a material fact relating to any security; or that they omitted to state such material fact in order to make the statement, in light of the circumstances it was made, not misleading. 17 Commodity-based market manipulation practices that are outlawed include: (a) wilful engagement by any person, in the making of a false report; (b) entering any false record or untrue statement of a material fact and/or omitting to make the material fact in order to make any statement relating to a commodity, commodity contract or option false and misleading. 18 Additionally, engaging in any transaction, act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon commodities investors and the employing of any device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the sale or purchase of any commodity is prohibited. 19 Internet-based market manipulation as well as franchise-related touting and manipulative practices are statutorily prohibited in California. 20 For example, the intentional making of any untrue statement of a material fact relating to the sale or purchase of a franchise is a felony under the California Corporations Code. 21 Moreover, the California Department of Corporations established the Internet Compliance and Enforcement Team to oversee the prohibition of Internet-based market manipulation by inter alia requiring all persons to obtain a permit before issuing any securities. 22
to as the Securities Services Act, in conjunction with the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets
Available Market Abuse Penalties and Remedies in California
An issuer or any person who wilfully engages in insider trading or market manipulation and fails to rely on the defences as earlier discussed 23 will be liable for a fine not more than $10 million upon conviction or be imprisoned in a state prison (or pursuant to the California Penal Code) 24 for a period between two and five years, or be liable for both the fine and imprisonment. 25 Moreover, an issuer as defined in the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 26 who commits insider trading, market manipulation or who violates any rule or order that prohibits market abuse will be criminally liable for a fine not more than $25 million upon conviction, or imprisonment in a state prison, or in terms of the California Penal Code, 27 for a period between two and five years and/or be liable for both such fine and imprisonment. 28 The California Corporations Code specifically imposes a fine not exceeding $10 million, or imprisonment in a state prison for a period between two and five years, or both such fine and imprisonment upon any person who wilfully employs, directly or indirectly, a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the offer, purchase or sale of securities. 29 Similarly, an issuer as defined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 30 who wilfully employs, directly or indirectly, a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the offer, purchase or sale of a security will be liable for a fine not exceeding $25 million, or imprisonment in a state prison for a period between two and five years, or both such fine and imprisonment. 31 Persons who violate the insider trading provisions will be directly liable to the person who sold or purchased the affected security for the damages equal to the difference between the price at which such security was sold or purchased and the market value which such security would have acquired at the time of the purchase or sale if the information known to the defendant had been publicly disseminated prior to that time. 32 This civil liability also includes interest at a legal rate accruing to the plaintiff (affected person) provided that a reasonable period of time has lapsed for the market to absorb the publicly disclosed material information, or that the defendant failed to rely on any available defences. 33 In addition, any person other than the issuer who commits insider trading will be liable to the issuer or anyone acting derivatively on behalf of the issuer for civil damages of up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of the insider trading in question. 34 Any person (defendant) who commits market manipulation will be liable for compensatory damages to any other person (plaintiff) who purchased or sold securities at an affected or manipulated price as a result of such defendant's illicit act or transaction. 35 This civil liability seems not to be limited to the plaintiff who initially bought or sold the securities that were affected by the defendant's market manipulation. 36 In the same vein, any person who wilfully disseminates false or misleading statements which relate to any securities will be liable to the affected person, for rescission or compensatory damages. 37 It is not required that the plaintiff should have actually relied on the false or misleading statements in question before the defendant is held liable for such recessionary or compensatory damages plus interest at a legal rate. 38 Furthermore, there is secondary civil liability for controlling persons, aiders and abettors who participated in disclosurebased market manipulation. 39 The California Corporations Code further imposes separate criminal penalties on any person who commits commodities-based market manipulation offences. 40 Such a person will be liable for a fine not more than $250 000 or imprisonment in a state prison, or pursuant to the California Penal Code for a period between two and five years or for both such fine and imprisonment. 41 With regard to civil liability, there are no private rights of action for the affected persons to recover their damages directly from those who commit commodities-based market manipulation offences. 42 Nevertheless, any person who aids or assists another person to contravene any commodities-based market manipulation provisions will be jointly and severally liable with any such person for damages. 43 Any person who wilfully engages in franchise-related touting and market manipulation will be liable to a fine not exceeding $100 000 or imprisonment in a state prison for a period not exceeding one year, or imprisonment pursuant to the California Penal Code, 44 or both such fine and imprisonment. 45 Such a person will also be liable to the franchisee, franchisor or any other affected person for compensatory damages. 46 injunctive relief. 47 The California Department of Corporations can also impose administrative penalties such as public censure, suspension, revocation of licenses, civil injunctions and administrative orders against any person who engages in fraudulent and manipulative Internet-based offering of investments and financial services. 48 Additionally, the California Department of Corporations can impose remedies such as rescission, restitution, civil penalties and administrative penalties against any person who commits Internet-based market manipulation offences. 49 Lastly, the California Department of Corporations can issue investigation orders against Internet-based market manipulation offenders and/or refer any such related criminal matters to the relevant courts for further investigation or prosecution. 50
Analysis and Evaluation of the California Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework
The California Department of Corporations, the Commissioner of Corporations and the relevant courts are responsible for the enforcement of market abuse provisions in California. 51 As earlier stated, 52 California employs criminal, civil and administrative sanctions to combat market abuse activities. 53 These sanctions are enforced by the California Department of Corporations through the Commissioner of Corporations and the courts. In relation to this, it is must be noted that there is no specific regulatory body established to oversee the enforcement of market abuse laws in California. Consequently, the Commissioner of Corporations has a variety of powers which include:
(a) imposing fees and penalties; (b) cease and desist orders; (c) revocation orders; (d) restitution orders; (e) civil injunction orders; (f) investigation orders; (g) public censure against the offenders; and (h) issuing permits to all persons who seek to offer or sell investments, commodities or securities in California. 54 The Commissioner of Corporations has further powers to make, amend or rescind any rules and/or orders for the purposes of effectively enforcing the securities and market abuse provisions. 55 Similarly, the Financial Services Board (the FSB) is empowered to make market abuse rules in South Africa. 56 Notwithstanding the fact that the there is no specific regulatory body that policies the enforcement of market abuse laws in California, it is submitted that the Commissioner of Corporations has, from time to time, consistently exercised his/her powers to curb market abuse activities. 57 With regard to Internet-based market manipulation, the California Department of Corporations relies on the Internet Compliance and Enforcement Team to investigate and prosecute any activities that amount to unlicensed securities, franchises or commodities offerings, and fraud and market manipulation. 58 The Internet Compliance and Enforcement Team also ensures that there is extensive investigation and surveillance of Internet-based market manipulation. 59 Accordingly, if any violation is detected, it will be reported to the Commissioner of Corporations who then determines whether it was fair and justifiable. 60 Corporations "Fighting Internet 'Cyber Investment Fraud'" <http://www.corp.ca.gov/pub/cyber.htm> (accessed 28-10-2013 57 Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 29-30. 58 Ss 25000 to 31516 of the California Corporations Code; also see Mariano "Stock Fraud Spurs Regulators to Look Online" (21-06-2000) <http: //news.cnet.com/news/01-1005-200-2126256.html> (accessed 29-10-2013) . 59 Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 24. 60 S 25140(c) Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 26-31. there is no specific regulatory body that prohibits and investigates Internet-based market abuse practices in South Africa. 62 The district courts have to date enabled the California Department of Corporations to enforce the market abuse prohibition consistently in California. For example, the California Department of Corporations has successfully filed for a number of civil remedies such as the disgorgement of profits, damages and civil injunctions in the courts. 63 Likewise, South Africa also provides for civil, 64 criminal 65 and administrative 66 penalties for insider trading in terms of the Financial Markets Act. With regard to criminal penalties, the South African legislature has rigidly provided for a fixed maximum fine of R50 million, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or both. 67 Although prima facie these penalties seem to be quite significant, it is submitted that Cassim 68 correctly argues that the current available market abuse penalties might not be high enough for deterrence purposes. For example, some unscrupulous persons and/or companies may take any fine for market abuse offences just like another cost of doing business. Furthermore, no distinction has been made in relation to the penalties imposed on natural and juristic persons to increase deterrence. 69 Moreover, in South Africa, civil and administrative penalties and remedies are mainly enforced by the FSB 70 and the Enforcement Committee (the EC) 71 respectively. However, the Financial Markets Act does not expressly provide civil penalties and remedies for market manipulation offences. 72 This flaw could potentially weaken South Africa's anti-market abuse regime, 73 compared to similar foreign legislation in countries like the US.
As briefly highlighted above, one can conclude that California has managed to develop a relatively consistent antimarket abuse enforcement framework that discourages a number of market abuse practices (including franchise-related, capital markets related as well as Internet-related market abuse violations).
Prohibition on Insider Trading in Delaware
Unlike the position in California, 74 insider trading is mainly outlawed as a breach of fiduciary duties by directors, officers or other employees (primary insiders) of an issuer who sell or purchase the issuer's securities or commodities on the basis of non-public inside information. 75 not suffer actual damages as result of the offender's alleged insider trading. 76 Likewise, a corporation may not repurchase its own shares if such repurchase will affect its payment of debts or cause capital impairment. 77 In addition, any sale or purchase of securities on the basis of non-public material information by a beneficial owner, director or officer of an insurer is also treated as insider trading. 78 This prohibition on insurance-related insider trading allows the insurer to recover any damages suffered within a period of less than six months unless the sale or purchase of the affected securities was done in good faith. 79 Intention on the part of the offenders is not required for the purposes incurring insurance-related insider trading liability. 80 On the other hand, in South Africa, there is no provision that specifically prohibits insurance-related insider trading in the Financial Markets Act. 81
Prohibition on Market Manipulation in Delaware
Any person who employs a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the offer, sale or purchase of a security will be liable for market manipulation. 82 In addition, any person who make or omits to make a statement of a material fact in order to deceive or mislead others to purchase or sale a security will be liable for fraud and/or market manipulation. 83 In the same light, any persons who are not registered with the Securities Commissioner are prohibited from offering to sell or purchase any securities. 84 Moreover, misleading filings and unlawful purchase or sale of securities by broker-dealers, shareholders or any other person are prohibited. 85 This was probably targeted at preventing securities or stock price market manipulation by professional persons like broker-dealers, investment advisors, shareholders and other relevant stakeholders.
Unlike the position in California, 86 under the Delaware courts, a breach of fiduciary duty of disclosure by directors who issue misstated financial statements or misleading public statements to defraud, induce or manipulate others to purchase or sell any securities may give rise to monetary damages against such directors. 87 Although it appears that there is no statutory provision that expressly prohibits commodities-based market manipulation in Delaware, a number of deceptive or unfair commerce, trade and insurance practices are outlawed to inter alia combat market abuse activities. 88 Delaware also prohibits racketeering and other forms of organised crime in order to discourage all persons from engaging in market abuse activities. 89 In contrast to this, there is no provision that specifically prohibits racketeering and/or commerce and trade-related market abuse activities in South Africa, especially under the Financial Markets Act. 90
Available Market Abuse Penalties and Remedies in Delaware
Any person who engages in fraudulent market manipulation which results in investors losing $50 000 or more will be 76 Brophy v Cities Service Co 5; Kahn v Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co LP (2010) CA No 436 (Del SC) & Guth v Loft Inc (1939) See ss 78; 80; 81 & 82. liable per violation to a fine not exceeding $200 000 upon conviction, or imprisonment for a period not more than five years at level V incarceration, or both such fine and imprisonment. 91 In the same way any person who engages in fraud or market manipulation which results in investors losing $10 000 or more but less than $50 000, will be liable per violation for a fine not more than $100 000 upon conviction, or imprisonment for a period not more than three years at level V incarceration, or both such fine and imprisonment. 92 Furthermore, any person who wilfully violates any related fraud or securities provisions of the Delaware Securities Act will be liable for a fine of not more than $100 000, or imprisonment for a period no more than two years, or both such fine and imprisonment. 93 The Securities Commissioner may impose injunctions, administrative remedies and stop orders to prohibit market abuse violations by the offenders by suspending or revoking the purchase or sale of any affected security. 94 A broker-dealer, broker-dealer agent, issuer agent, investment advisor, investment advisor's representative or any other person who offers, sells or purchases securities by means of an untrue statement or any other market manipulation practices will be liable for civil compensatory damages. 95 Moreover, the courts may impose upon the insider trading offenders, orders for damages, disgorgement of illicit profits and other applicable remedies. 96 The courts may further impose a fine of up to $5 million or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 20 years upon the insider trading offenders. 97 With regard to prohibited manipulative trade practices, the offenders may be ordered by the relevant courts through an injunction to pay legal costs, compensatory damages or to disgorge any profits gained to the affected persons. 98 Moreover, any persons who engage in insurance related market abuse activities will be ordered by the courts to disgorge any profits they gained at the expense of the insurers. 99 The Commissioner of Insurance may also issue cease and desist orders and penalty orders against any person who commits insurance-related market abuse offences. 100
Analysis and Evaluation of the Delaware Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework
Like California, 101 Delaware does not have a specific regulatory body that enforces its market abuse laws. Nonetheless, Delaware has established a consistent system of reliance on judicial law standards, as well as well-developed common law and private enforcement measures to combat market abuse activities. 102 Consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court, the Delaware Chancery Court, the Delaware General Assembly, the Delaware Corporate Law Council, the Delaware Division of Securities and the Delaware Division Corporations bear the responsibility of enforcing the Delaware's securities and market abuse laws. 103 As stated earlier, 104 Delaware generally treats any securities dealing that is based on non-public inside information by primary insiders as a breach of fiduciary duties that also amounts to insider trading. Thus, although Delaware does not have a statutory provision that expressly prohibits insider trading, it has to date successfully relied on common law principles on fiduciary duties to combat insider trading. 105 This success has prompted other commentators to conclude 91 S 73-604(a) of the Delaware Securities Act. 92 S 73-604(b) of the Delaware Securities Act. 93 S 73-604(c) 35-37 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/558> (accessed 03-11-2013) . 103 Roe "Washington and Delaware as Corporate Lawmakers" 2009 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 638 8-12 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/638> (accessed 03-11-2013) ; Jones "Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement" 2005 Boston College Law School Faculty Paper 36 2 <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/36> (accessed 04-11-2013 that Delaware was effectively combating insider trading and market manipulation because it cedes other areas of its laws that involve insider trading enforcement to the federal government. 106 Unlike the position in Delaware, insider trading liability is not limited to instances where there is a breach of a fiduciary duty by primary insiders in South Africa. 107 On the other hand, Delaware's fiduciary-related insider trading remedies were controversially applied in some few cases. 108 Be that as it may, one fact which is certain is that Delaware relies heavily on its courts' judicial law standards and private enforcement to monitor and enforce its insider trading prohibition. 109 In addition to the Delaware specialised corporate bar, courts and judicial law standards, 110 the Delaware Division Corporations' Securities Commissioner has powers to investigate, subpoena any suspects and issue stop orders, injunctions and other administrative remedies against any persons who commit insider trading or market manipulation. 111 Likewise, the Commissioner of Insurance may issue investigation orders, cease and desist orders, penalty orders and judicial review orders against any market abuse offenders. 112 This has enabled Delaware Division Corporations to effectively complement the relevant courts in tackling and addressing market abuse challenges. 113 Unlike California, 114 Delaware further has a specialised commercial court and whistle-blower immunity provisions to encourage employees or any person to report any securities and market abuse violations without fear of reprisals from their employers or other offenders. 115 In relation to this, South Africa relies mainly on the FSB rather than judicial law standards to enforce its market abuse prohibition. Moreover, South Africa's market abuse laws do not have a specific whistle-blower immunity provision to encourage all persons to report market abuse violations to the FSB or other relevant authorities without any fear of victimisation. 116 Furthermore, as earlier stated, 117 the criminal penalties and/or available remedies for market abuse offences are still relatively few and little for deterrence purposes.
Given the above analysis, one can conclude that Delaware has to date managed to flexibly and consistently develop effective and robust common law as well as judicial law standards to increase the private enforcement of its market abuse prohibition. Perhaps this explains why some commentators allude to the fact that Delaware is the "corporate haven" of the US. (27-07-2011 ) Client Alert 1-4 <http://www.milbank.com.cl/al.pdf> (accessed 27-07-2013 , apparently, this socalled Brophy claim for insider trading damages is contingent upon the courts' interpretation of the violation in question. Similarly, in Zapata Corporation v Maldonado (1981) 430 A2d 779 (Del Ch) , it was held that affected persons will only recover their insider trading damages if prior investigations were objectively conducted and such objectivity is discretionally determined by the courts. 109 Kahan & Rock "Symbiotic Federalism and The Structure of Corporate Law" 2005 Vanderbilt Law Review 1573 1604 -1609 & 1620 Ott "Delaware Strikes Back: Newcastle Partners and The Fight for State Corporate Autonomy" 2007 Indiana Law Journal 159 171-173; Cary "Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware" 1974 Yale Law Journal 663 666-670; Roe 2009 (accessed 03-11-2013) . 110 Wilson 2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 484; 486 & 490. 111 1-5 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/558> (accessed 03-11-2013) ; Wilson 2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 481-493; Ott 2007 Indiana Law Journal 159-162; Ahdieh "From 'Federalization' to 'Mixed Governance' in Corporate Law: A Defence of Sarbanes-Oxley" 2005 Buff Law Review 721 736; Cary 1974 MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 5 No 7 May 2014 63
Prohibition on Insider Trading in Washington
Unlike South Africa 119 and California, 120 Washington does not have a specific provision that directly and expressly prohibits insider trading. Nevertheless, insider trading is indirectly outlawed by discouraging directors, officers or employees from using non-public information filed with or obtained from the Department of Financial Institutions to deal in any security or commodity for personal gain. 121 In contrast to the position in Delaware, 122 liability for insider trading is apparently not restricted only to instances where there is a breach of fiduciary duties by primary insiders in Washington. Moreover, Washington does not clearly provide whether it is required that the offenders should have profited or benefited from their alleged insider trading before incurring any liability. 123 The prohibition on insider trading is primarily restricted to directors, officers or other employees of a company. 124 Despite this, Washington prohibits broker-dealers, investment advisors and any other person from offering or selling any security or commodity without being registered to prevent insider trading and other related illicit practices. 125
Prohibition on Market Manipulation in Washington
Any person who employs a device, scheme or artifice to manipulate the offer, sale or purchase of securities will be liable for fraud and/or market manipulation. 126 Similarly, any person who received a consideration from another person is prohibited from employing a scheme, device, an act, practice or course of business and/or a dishonest practice for the purposes of influencing or advising other persons to purchase or sale any security. 127 Accordingly, an investment advisor, broker-dealer or any other person who knowingly and manipulatively purchases or sells any security for his own account or for another person will be liable for market manipulation. 128 This also indicates that trade-based market manipulation practices are statutorily outlawed in Washington.
Likewise, disclosure-based market manipulation practices such as the making of false or misleading statements of a material fact or omitting to make a material fact in relation to any filed documents for the purposes of influencing the purchase or sale of any securities are prohibited. 129 In relation to this, offering or selling unregistered securities by any person is expressly prohibited in Washington. 130 This prohibition is mainly aimed at discouraging all persons from deliberately engaging in unlawful fraudulent or market manipulation activities.
Commodity-based market manipulation is also prohibited in Washington. For example, no person may directly or indirectly employ a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or influence others to purchase or sale any commodity contract or commodity option. 131 Additionally, any person who engages in a transaction, act, practice, or course of business that will deceive others, 132 or who makes a false or misleading report, record or statement of a material fact by omission or otherwise 133 in order to induce others to purchase or sell any commodity or commodity option will be liable for market manipulation. Notably, any person who deliberately omits to state a material fact in relation to the purchase or sale of any commodity contract or commodity option will be liable for such omission and/or market manipulation. 134 Moreover, no person may purchase or sell a commodity contract or commodity option, or engage in a trade, business or other act as a commodity merchant unless he is registered, licensed or exempted by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 135 This preventative measure is employed to combat commodity-based market manipulation. In contrast to the position in Washington state, South Africa's market abuse laws do not have a specific provision that directly and expressly prohibits commodities-based market abuse practices. 136
Available Market Abuse Penalties and Remedies in Washington
Any person who commits insider trading, market manipulation or other related securities violations will be liable upon conviction for a fine not exceeding $5 000, or imprisonment for a period of not more than ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment. 137 Similarly, any person who alters, destroys, shreds or conceals a record or document and/or who knowingly attempts to make a false or misleading statement of a material fact will be liable for a class B felony or a fine not exceeding $500 000, or both such fine and class B felony. 138 The Director of Financial Institutions may refer any criminal matters to the attorney general for further investigation and prosecution. 139 Furthermore, any person who commits fraud, market manipulation or other related securities violations will be liable to the person buying or selling the affected securities for civil damages and reasonable legal costs plus 8% interest per annum. 140 Every person who directly or indirectly controls another person and who commits or aids another person to commit market manipulation and other related securities violations will be jointly and severally liable with such person for civil damages and reasonable legal costs plus 8% interest per annum. 141 The Director of Financial Institutions may also institute administrative actions such as restraining orders, administrative fines, injunctions, orders for judicial review and stop orders against the securities and market abuse offenders. 142 Accordingly, any person who filed a false or misleading report or statement of a material fact in order to engage in market abuse activities or any other related securities violations will be liable to the affected persons for damages and reasonable legal costs. 143 The Director of Financial Institutions may further suspend the sale or trading of the affected securities by or through a broker-dealer, until the false or misleading statements or reports are corrected. 144 Persons who perpetrate commodity-based market abuse and other related violations will be liable to a fine not exceeding $20 000 upon conviction, or imprisonment for a period not more than ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment. 145 However, no liability will be imputed upon any accused person if he proves that he had no knowledge of the violated rule or order or that he acted in good faith. 146 The prosecuting attorney may further impose criminal proceedings against any person who wilfully commits fraud, market manipulation or any other commodities-related violations. 147 The Director of Financial Institutions may, through the courts, issue compliance orders, declaratory judgments, cease and desist orders, summary orders, suspension orders, restitution orders, order for civil penalties, injunctions and other civil or administrative remedies against those who contravene the commodities provisions through fraud or market abuse practices. 148
Analysis and Evaluation of the Washington Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework
The Director of Financial Institutions, courts (including the attorney general's office) and the Department of Financial Institutions share the responsibility of enforcing the market abuse prohibition in Washington. 149 As stated earlier, 150 Washington does not have a specific provision that prohibits insider trading. Accordingly, this could be creating some enforcement challenges for both the courts and the Department of Financial Institutions. For instance, it is extremely difficult to prove whether the accused person has knowingly committed any insider trading violations because the insider trading offence is not clearly defined. 151 A number of civil, criminal and administrative penalties may be employed by the Director of Financial Institutions against any market abuse offenders. For example, the Director of Financial Institutions may impose administrative penalties such as public censure, suspension or revocation of the license of any broker-dealer, salesperson, investment advisor's representative, investment advisor or any other person who commits market abuse and other related securities violations. 152 Remarkably, unlike the position in Washington, the FSB is not statutorily and expressly empowered to use public censure against the market abuse offenders in South Africa. 153 The Director of Financial Institutions has further powers to investigate (publicly or privately) market abuse and other related violations. 154 In line with this, the Director of Financial Institutions may subpoena witnesses in relation to any ongoing investigation which pertains to securities or market abuse violations. 155 Unlike Delaware, 156 Washington statutorily empowers its Director of Financial Institutions to publicly disseminate any information concerning an ongoing market abuse investigation and/or any other securities or commodities violations, if such dissemination is in the public interest. 157 The Director of Financial Institutions may also impose administrative sanctions like injunctions, mandamus, cease and desist orders, restraining orders and restitution orders against any person who commits market abuse offences or violates any provision of the Securities Act of Washington. 158 The Director of Financial Institutions relies on the relevant courts to enforce its administrative sanctions or other court actions against the market abuse offenders and those who violate the relevant rules. 159 The courts play a key role in judicial review hearings involving any person aggrieved by an order or decision of the Director of Financial Institutions. 160 Unlike Delaware 161 and California, 162 Washington statutorily empowers the Director of Financial Institutions to cooperate with other State and federal enforcement authorities in order to effectively combat fraud, market abuse and other related securities or commodities violations. 163 Another advantage of Washington is the statutory availability of nonexclusive common law penalties and private rights of action for the prejudiced persons to claim their damages directly from the market abuse offenders. 164 This has enabled Washington to have some influence on corporate law making (including the development and enforcement market abuse laws) both at State and federal levels in the US. 165 Likewise, the Financial Markets Act now directly empowers the FSB to cooperate with other local and international regulatory bodies in order to enhance the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa. 166 However, it remains to be seen whether this provision 167 will be successfully employed to investigate and combat cross-border market abuse activities in South Africa and elsewhere. In addition, as earlier stated, 168 the available penalties and/or available remedies for market abuse offences are still minimal and somewhat inconsistently 169 enforced in South Africa.
Concluding Remarks
The article has revealed that the regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban in the US mainly involves the relevant financial or corporation departments at the states level. 170 Although this state prohibition on market abuse is not uniform, 171 it has, to a great extent, relatively managed to consistently discourage market abuse practices in the US.
On the other hand, the South African market abuse regime relies mainly on the FSB to police and enforce the market abuse ban. This approach has so far not been able to achieve more settlements and prosecutions in cases involving market abuse in South Africa. 172 This could be evidenced in part, by many delays in investigations, settlements and the inherent paucity of successful criminal prosecutions obtained in market abuse cases in South Africa to date. 173 Moreover, deficiencies such as the inconsistent application of the market abuse provisions and the use of few enforcement measures have directly impeded the curbing of market abuse in South Africa. 174 In light of these and other flaws indicated above, it is submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact specific provisions for separate and distinct criminal penalties that can be imposed upon any juristic person or individual who commit or attempts to commit insider trading or market manipulation offences in South Africa (with higher criminal penalties being imposed on such juristic persons).
It is also suggested that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to provide specific market abuse whistleblower immunity provisions and bounty rewards for the purposes of encouraging all the persons to report market abuse activities to the FSB and/or other relevant enforcement authorities in South Africa. Furthermore, the Financial Markets Act should be amended to statutorily and expressly empower the FSB to use public censure against the market abuse offenders in South Africa. Additionally, the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact provisions that specifically prohibit insurance-related as well as Internet-based market abuse practices in South Africa.
Furthermore, as is the position in Delaware (where there is a system in place for periodic revisions of the Delaware Codes), the South African policy makers should consider appointing a National Market Abuse Commission to examine and review all the matters and laws pertaining to market abuse in South Africa. In conclusion, another option is for the South African policy makers to consider introducing provincial market abuse statutes to: (a) create regulatory competition among the provinces to attract investors by effectively combating market abuse activities (b) promote dual or concurrent regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban both at a provincial and national level. This should, however, be managed well to avoid creating potential problems such as balkanisation and/or violating the autrefois acquit or autrefois convict doctrine.
